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Abstract
What prevents majorities from extracting surplus from minorities in leg-
islatures? We study an innite horizon game where a legislative body votes
to determine distributive policy each period. Proposals accepted by a simple
majority are implemented, otherwise the status quo allocation prevails. We
construct a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium that exhibits compromise
in the following sense: if the initial status quo allocation is \not too unequal",
then the Markov process is absorbed into allocations in which more than a
minimum winning majority receives a positive share of the social surplus with
positive probability. The compromise is only sustainable if, starting from the
\unequal" allocations, the Markov process is absorbed into allocations in which
there is a complete absence of compromise. The compromise equilibrium exists
when discounting is neither too small nor too large. We nd that, contrary
to intuition, the range of discount factors for which this equilibrium exists
increases as the number of legislators increases. In this sense, compromise is
easier in larger legislatures.
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Many legislatures require the consent of only a simple majority to implement poli-
cies. It follows that when distributive policy is being determined, a simple majority
of legislators can split the entire surplus among themselves. Yet observed outcomes
in which resources are distributed beyond a minimal majority are common. Exam-
ples such as military bases, transportation and agricultural subsidies all share this
property to varying degrees. This paper examines the possibility that compromise
| agreed upon outcomes in which more than a minimum winning majority receives
a positive share of the social surplus | is sustainable in legislatures.
We posit a model of legislative bargaining and construct an equilibrium in which
compromise may occur. In each period, a law is proposed by a randomly selected
legislator and is passed by a majority vote.1 If the current period's proposal fails
to achieve a majority vote, the previous period's allocation is implemented. In
this setting, each member of today's majority is concerned that he might belong to
tomorrow's minority. With concave preferences, each legislator has an incentive to
smooth his allocation over time, and this motive can lead to an equilibrium in which
compromise occurs.
The setup resembles the legislative process that distributes benets under many
federal spending programs in the United States. The distribution of benets is
enacted by the legislature and written into law. This distribution remains eective
until new legislation is passed to alter it. When benets are distributed by this kind
of process, laws made today can potentially be overturned tomorrow, so legislators
must consider the trade-os between appropriating political spoils in the short term
or more equitably sharing benets in the long term.2 In particular, a legislator with
proposal power cannot be certain he will have proposal power in the future and may
prefer to distribute benets among more legislators than a bare majority, in order
to secure benets for himself in the future.
We construct a symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium such that if the initial
status quo allocation is not too unequal, the equilibrium Markov process is absorbed
1This stylized legislative process is common in the literature on legislative bargaining. It was
introduced by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) who argue that, with a large number of legislators, each
seeking to put forward his own policy, a legislative process that does not favor a particular legislator
will result in a randomly selected proposer each period.
2We show that this motivation can be present in the absence of other explanations for an even
distribution of benets such as reputation or institutional eects.
1into a closed class of proposals that exhibit compromise.3 Critically, the compromise
is only sustainable if starting from the remaining unequal allocations, the Markov
process is absorbed into a closed class of proposals in which there is no compromise. If
initial allocations are unevenly distributed, legislators cherry-pick minimum-winning
coalitions and eventually the equilibrium transitions into this class. The sensitivity to
initial conditions suggests that distributive policies that have a balanced allocation
have their origins in conditions that were already somewhat equitable, while the
reverse is true for unevenly distributed policies.
Standard repeated game arguments could also explain compromise in such a set-
ting. If legislators condition on the entire history of play, simple trigger strategies
could yield the compromise we observe, but there are good reasons why trigger strate-
gies would be problematic in our setting. The rst is that there is little evidence of
legislators being \punished" in the allocation of benets through distributive policy,
so trigger strategies do not appear to be the equilibrium strategies being played.4
In addition, most legislatures are characterized by periodic turnover. For example,
the United States House of Representatives consists of 435 members each serving a
two-year term, in Israel there are 120 members of the Knesset each serving 4-year
terms, and the Mexican Chamber of Deputies comprises 500 deputies each serving
three-year terms with no re-election. Even with powerful incumbency advantages,
Matland and Studlar (2004) estimate 10% average annual legislative turnover for 25
countries, or 32% turnover per election. This periodic turnover can result in a lack
of institutional memory.
Given potential memory problems it makes sense to restrict attention to Markov
perfect equilibria, since these are subgame perfect equilibria in which players choose
strategies that require no memory of past play beyond that which is relevant to
today's payos. The Markov assumption does not imply that individual legislators
have no memory. However, equilibrium \memory" captured by a legislature with
turnover can be appropriately modeled as depending only on the current, payo
relevant information.
In this game the payo-relevant information, or the state variable, is the status
quo allocation and the current period's proposer. The stage game is a game of
3 We use the term closed class as dened in Norris (1997). It is similar to the notion of an
absorbing state, but refers to a set of states. Once a state in the closed class has been reached, the
Markov process will not transition to a state outside that class.
4See Krehbiel (1991).
2pure conict and, since the state variable does not embody any information that is
mutually benecial to all legislators, they have no reason to be more cooperative
at certain times than others.5 The one shot Nash equilibrium of this game is for
the proposer to oer a minimum winning coalition their status quo allocation, and
extract the remainder of the surplus for himself. The diculty in nding compromise
in Markov equilibria is the proposer's natural desire to extract short term gains.
Yet an incentive to overcome this is present in our game, without requiring our
equilibrium to use a punishment scheme. The previous literature has so far been
unable to show this.
To sustain the equilibrium legislators' discount factors must lie in an intermediate
range, that is, they are required to be neither too patient nor too impatient. To
understand the importance of impatience, suppose legislators discount factors were
very high, and suppose someone deviated from the compromise class. To prevent
such a deviation, the process must spiral towards the no-compromise class. However,
a legislator with a very high discount factor would unilaterally make an oer to return
to the compromise class, that would in turn be accepted, thereby halting the spiral
towards no-compromise.6
We nd that as the number of legislators increases, the range of discount factors
that sustains these equilibria increases. Since more legislators means greater un-
certainty over the agenda-setter, continuations that involve no compromise become
less attractive, while compromise continuations become more attractive. This is in
contrast to the conventional wisdom due to Olson (1965) that suggests cooperation
diminishes as group size increases.7
We also nd that as the utility function becomes more concave the upper bound
and the lower bound on the range of admissible discount factors both decrease.
5This is in contrast to games that are studied in Battaglini and Coate (2006) where the state
variable is public debt. A high level of public debt is mutually disadvantageous to all legislators.
This echoes a result by Dutta (1995), where he nds that sustaining ecient Markov prefect
equilibria requires some amount of \state symmetry". This condition is clearly violated in our
model.
6Markov equilibria of the type of game we analyze are notoriously dicult to characterize because
of the innite multi-dimensional state space. As such, we characterize one equilibrium with the
feature that compromise is a possible outcome, and it obtains when discount factors are within a
certain range. Other equilibria of this model with risk averse legislators have not yet been found
in the current literature, but work has been done by Kalandrakis (2003), (2007) and Duggan and
Kalandrakis (2006) in closely related models. These are discussed at the end of the Introduction.
7Other authors that have also shown a converse result are Pecorino (1999), Haag and Laguno
(2007), and Esteban and Ray (2001).
3The intuition is that as concavity increases, the compromise continuation becomes
more attractive, hence less-patient legislators are willing to oer it, but at the same
time, less patience is needed for there to be an incentive to spiral towards the no-
compromise.
The fact that we nd equilibria that exhibit compromise when restricted to
Markovian strategies implies that even institutions without a mechanism for con-
veying history can result in a compromise outcome. Additionally, we show that
compromise can be possible in a legislative setting without explicit motives for it,
such as in vote-trading. With distributive policy any outcome that improves the
position of one legislator is at the expense of some other legislator so there is no
incentive to trade votes. The rationale for compromise in our equilibrium is based
on the aversion to the possibility of being disadvantaged in the future. This ra-
tionale sustains compromise without appealing to the possibility of side payments,
as in Merlo (2000), log-rolling, parliamentary procedures or any other features of
legislatures that could have been included in the model.
Our work is related to that of Dixit, Grossman and Gul (2000) who investigate
political compromise based on tacit cooperation in a two-party framework. They con-
sider ecient subgame perfect equilibria for a similar model with only two players
and employ trigger strategies to sustain compromise. They nd that the possibil-
ity of compromise between parties diminishes with the length of time any single
party retains power. The model analyzed by Dixit et.al is relevant when considering
compromise between political parties in a two-party system, in contrast we consider
compromise among many competing legislators, each of whom is interested solely in
distribution of benets towards their district.8 Laguno (2001) looks at the question
of civil liberties and the formation of legal standards through majority voting. He
nds that due to imprecise signals and the possibility of making mistakes, in equi-
librium, groups choose standards that are not too severe. This argument parallels
what we nd. The lack of severe standards can be viewed as a compromise outcome
and is driven by the noise introduced by imprecise signalling. Similarly in our model,
compromise is driven by the uncertainty over the identity of future agenda-setters.9
Our game closely resembles that analyzed by Kalandrakis (2004) who considers
8We do not factor in ideological bias along party lines when considering payos, hence coalitions
form independent of party aliation. This basis of coalition formation is supported in empirical
work by Lee (2000).
9Battaglini and Coate (2006) also include a bargaining game similar to ours as part of their
model, but the status quo is not endogenous.
4three risk neutral legislators. He nds that equilibrium outcomes are absorbed in a
closed class in which the proposer takes all. Kalandrakis (2007) extends this result
to the case of ve or more risk-neutral legislators and with arbitrary recognition
probabilities. He again shows that outcomes are absorbed in the no-compromise
closed class.10 Duggan and Kalandrakis (2006) prove a general existence result for
this class of games, but the result does not extend to equilibria with more than a
minimum winning majority obtaining a positive allocation. The equilibria found in
the papers discussed above result in the proposer being able to extract the entire
surplus. This provides a counterpoint to our paper, as we show that a sharing
outcome is possible in equilibrium.
Earlier work on the dynamics of distributive policy was done by Baron and Fere-
john (1989), Baron (1996) and Gerber and Ortuno-Ortin (1998). Baron and Ferejohn
(1989) was one of the earliest works to look at the dynamics of political compromise.
Baron (1996) and Gerber and Ortuno-Ortin (1998) considered the case of a public
good and a single dimensional policy space. Baron (1996) looked at a dynamic policy
setting game, whereas Gerber and Ortuno-Ortin (1998) looked at a static game and
considered the endogenous formation of coalitions. Both these papers obtained a
version of the Median Voter Theorem, with some form of compromise occurring in
equilibrium, but these are not games of direct conict.
This paper adds to a growing literature emphasizing the constraints on proposal
making power in dynamic distributive policy (Fong (2006), Battaglini and Palfrey
(2007), Diermeier and Fong (2007)). Notably, Diermeier and Fong (2007) investigate
endogenous limits on proposal power. They show that in an institutional setting in
which one legislator is always the proposer and can make repeated proposals, the
other legislators have an incentive to reject proposals allocating a zero share to
other non-proposing legislators, hence reducing the ability of the proposer to extract
the entire surplus. This is complimentary to the result in our equilibrium starting
from the \well distributed" status quo allocations. We also show that starting from
\uneven" status quo allocations the proposal power is essentially unconstrained as in
10Kalandrakis (2007) also shows that with equal recognition probabilities, and for a subset of
state variables where a half or more legislators have a zero status quo allocation, the equilibrium
strategies for the linear utility game satisfy incentive constraints for utility functions that exhibit
some concavity. He provides sucient conditions on the utility functions to ensure this incentive
compatibility. The equilibrium we construct is complementary in the sense that we have similar
strategies leading to the no-compromise class for the same set of state variables. The derived
restrictions on concavity in Kalandrakis (2007) are satised by a more restrictive concavity condition
that we assume.
5earlier models. We show this in an environment where proposal power is randomly
allocated to each legislator in each period thereby reducing the incentive to \protect"
other non-proposing legislators' rights.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the
general model with n + 1 legislators. In Section 3 we give a brief illustration of the
equilibrium we characterize, and some intuition for the strategies. In Section 4 we
formally characterize the equilibrium. Section 5 provides some comparative statics
results and Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
We present here a stylized version of the legislative process. Let I = f1;:::;n + 1g
be a set of n + 1 symmetric legislators, where n  6 and n even.11 They play a
policy setting game over an innite number of periods t = 1;2;:::. Each period a
surplus of unit size is divided among the n+1 legislators' districts, and each split of
the surplus is an element of the n-dimensional simplex, n. Let the vector st 2 n





the share to legislator i's district. Legislator i is concerned only about the welfare
of his district. The payo to legislator i in period t, is given by u(st
i), where u()
is increasing and strictly concave allowing for inter-temporal gains from smoothing.
All legislators discount the future with a common discount factor, , and legislator











At the beginning of each period a legislator, xt 2 I, is randomly recognized
to make a proposal for the division of the surplus for that period. Legislators are
recognized with equal probability in each period. This proposer selection process was
rst motivated by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) as discussed in the introduction. The
recognized legislator, xt, then makes a proposal, p 2 n, which is voted on by all
11In many legislatures district representation is allocated by population size hence the assumption
of symmetry seems appropriate.
12The discount factor can be thought of as not only the usual discounting of future payos, but
also including some small probability of leaving oce.
6legislators, each legislator having a single vote. A simple majority of votes is required
for a proposal to be implemented, hence the proposer requires n
2 legislators besides
himself to be in agreement. If the proposal fails to achieve n
2 other legislators' vote,
the status quo allocation, st 1, prevails. The persistence of the status quo allocation
reects the fact that the allocation schemes of the policies we consider remain intact
if no new legislation is passed to alter it.
We ask whether or not the physical payo-relevant information is enough to
allow coordination on an equitable outcome as is reected in the data. As argued in
the introduction, legislatures that are characterized by a large number of members
with periodic turnover may embody little institutional memory. We therefore focus
on the class of subgame perfect equilibria consisting of Markovian strategies, i.e.
Markov perfect equilibria. Before formally dening our notion of a Markov perfect
equilibrium it is useful to give a brief description of the equilibrium strategies we
characterize. We do this in the next section, and then formally characterize the
equilibrium.
3 Equilibrium Illustration
Following Kalandrakis (2007), let ,  = 0;:::;n be a collection of subsets of n





n : jfi : s
t 1
i = 0gj = 
	
For example, letting P denote the set of all permutations, , of a vector, we have
n = P(1;0;:::;0 | {z }
n
):
The set n is the set of proposals in which one legislator receives the entire share,
hence we will call n our no-compromise class. Dene also the set 1 where one
legislator receives zero, and the remaining legislators receive an equal share. That is,
1  P( 1
n;:::; 1
n;0). We refer to the set 1 as our compromise class of proposals.
Note that 1  1.
The model is specied for seven or more legislators, but we can illustrate the
essential elements of the equilibrium for the three-legislator case. The equilibrium
strategies are inconsistent with this case, but the intuition for the results remain
7intact. 13 With three legislators, all policy proposals lie in the two dimensional
simplex. The set of proposals where a single legislator receives a zero share and the
remaining legislators split the surplus evenly are the points that lie half-way along
each face of the simplex as illustrated in simplex on the left in Figure 1. Using the







. The vertices of the simplex on the right in Figure 1, illustrate





Figure 1: Closed Classes
The main proposition of the paper states that we characterize a symmetric
Markov perfect equilibrium, MPE, in which the compromise class is reached in equi-
librium. Clearly the set 1 is not the most obvious compromise class to sustain in






. We nd that
this class cannot be sustained as an equilibrium with the strategies specied because
there needs to be some asymmetry in payos within the compromise class. This is to
allow a modest punishment if there is a deviation from the compromise to allocations
that lead back to compromise. We will discuss in section 4.3 how the equilibrium
extends to other compromise classes that display some asymmetry.
The equilibrium we characterize is subject to initial conditions. If initial allo-
cations are \well distributed" among non-proposing legislators, the proposer nds
the compromise proposal to be most attractive in equilibrium. What we mean by
\well distributed" will be made precise in the characterization below. If the initial
allocations are closer to the vertices, the no-compromise becomes more attractive.
Assuming legislator 1 is the proposer, the allocations that lead to the compromise
class lie within the boundary illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 2.
13One reason the prescribed strategies are not an equilibrium in the case of three legislators is
that the compromise, generally speaking, involves one legislator receiving zero and the remaining
legislators splitting the surplus evenly. In the case of three legislators, this proposal takes the form
(1
2; 1
2;0). However a cherry-picking proposal which can lead to the no-compromise, also takes this




Figure 2: Equilibrium Illustration
Impatient legislators whose smoothing incentives are not too extreme always have
an incentive to capture as much of the surplus as possible for their district at the
expense of the other legislative districts. This is reected in the equilibrium strate-
gies. Consider allocations that are not on the face of the simplex. We will call these
interior allocations and their dening characteristic is that the proposing legislator
cannot identify n
2 non-proposing legislators with a zero status quo allocation.14 With
the n = 6 case this corresponds to allocations where at least 5 legislators have a pos-
itive share, and if the proposer has a zero status quo allocation, at least 4 legislators
can have a positive share and it is still considered interior.
Now consider interior allocations that are outside the shaded area. Under the
equilibrium strategies a proposing legislator identies a minimum winning coalition
of legislators that demand the least, and includes them in a coalition by oering
them just enough to make them indierent between the status quo allocation and
the current proposal. In the n = 6 case, the coalition consists of at least 3 other
legislators in addition to the proposer. These legislators will be \cherry-picked" to
form a minimum winning coalition and the other three legislators will be frozen out
and given no allocation. In the very next period if the proposing legislator was one of
those in the original coalition, hence has a positive status quo allocation, he has the
opportunity to extract the entire surplus. This leads to a sustained no-compromise
outcome where each legislator grabs the entire surplus when he is the proposer. If the
proposer in this period has a zero status quo allocation (hence was not in the original
coalition), he will cherry-pick the other two legislators who were frozen out, and one
member of the original coalition who now has a positive status quo allocation. In
the next period the no-compromise class is reached.
14Notice that by this denition if the proposer has a zero status quo, and n
2  1 other legislators
have a zero status quo, this is also an interior allocation.
9Notice from the above discussion that a legislator with a zero status quo allocation
will strictly prefer receiving zero when the proposal is in P(1;0;:::;0), to receiving
zero when the proposal is in P(s1;:::;s n
2 +1;0;:::;0). This is because under both
proposals the current period payo is 0, but under the rst proposal if he becomes
the proposer in the next period he receives a payo of 1, whereas under the second
proposal if he becomes the proposer in the second period he must share the surplus
with at least one other legislator.
What prevents the spiral towards no-compromise from happening in the shaded
region? These allocations are well-distributed making the demands of the minimum
winning coalition relatively high, so the proposer makes an oer to split the sur-
plus between himself and one other legislator, knowing that in the next period the
proposer will have an incentive to sustain this sharing. Once legislators have the
expectation that sharing will occur, it is too costly to buy them o with a cherry-
picking proposal, so the compromise is maintained. In the next sections we formalize
this intuition.
4 Markov Perfect Equilibrium
With Markov perfect equilibria players' strategies condition only on information that
is relevant to current period payos. The payo relevant variables in this model are
the status quo allocation and the identity of the proposing legislator, (st 1;xt) 2 n
I. A complete history of the state is therefore dened as ht = (s0;x1;:::;st 1;xt).
Each legislator's strategy is a pair (i;i) such that i is legislator i's acceptance
strategy and i is legislator i's mixed proposal strategy. A mixed proposal strategy
for legislator i, is a probability function i(;ht). Given a history of the state ht and
a proposal p, i(p;ht) will be the probability legislator i assigns to proposal p. An




1 if legislator i accepts proposal p;
0 if legislator i rejects proposal p:
A strategy prole is given by (;) where  is a vector of acceptance strategies for
all legislators, and  is a vector of proposal strategies. Note that these acceptance and
proposal strategies can potentially condition on the entire history of the state, ht. We
restrict our attention to Markovian strategies for the reasons explain before hence we
10consider only proposal and acceptance strategies that condition on (st 1;xt). That
is, we focus on a strategy pair [i(;st 1;xt);i(;st 1;xt)].15
We seek a notion of symmetry for the legislators' strategies reecting the fact
that any legislator i will be expected to behave in the same manner as legislator j
if he was in legislator j's position. More concretely, dene the one-to-one operator,
 : I ! I that represents any permutation of the identity of the legislators. Given
a proposal vector, p = (p1;:::;pn+1), and permutation (), we denote the resulting
permuted proposal as p = (p(1);:::;p(n+1)). A permutation of the state variable
(st 1;xt) is therefore denoted (s
t 1
 ;(xt)), and a symmetric strategy prole is given
by the following denition.
Denition 1. A strategy prole (;) is symmetric if for any permutation of the













Given a proposal, p, and an acceptance strategy prole  the law of motion for












This simply says that if the proposal receives the required majority of votes it is
implemented, otherwise the policy reverts to the status quo. The expected dynamic

















A Markov perfect equilibrium strategy prole must maximize this dynamic payo
15Although we restrict attention to Markov strategies as our equilibrium concept, in Deni-
tion 2 below we ensure that equilibrium strategies are robust to any history contingent strategy,
[i(;ht);i(;ht)] .
11for all legislators, for all possible states and must be a best response among any
history contingent strategy. This leads to Denition 2.16
Denition 2. A symmetric Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE) is a symmetric strat-
egy prole, (;), such that for all (st 1;xt) 2 n  I, for all [i(;ht);i(;ht)],














We seek to identify a symmetric MPE in which more than a minimum winning
majority of legislators receive a positive allocation in each period. We dene a
compromise outcome as one is which this occurs. Formally
Denition 3. An allocation, st, exhibits compromise if jfi : st
i > 0gj > n
2 + 1.
Notice that our compromise class, 1, satises this denition. To ensure that
when incentives to maintain compromise do not hold, there is an incentive to cherry-
pick a minimum winning coalition before obtaining the no-compromise class we have
assumption 1 that essentially says that the utility function is not too concave.
Assumption 1. The utility function u() satises the concavity restriction
n + 1   
n + 1   n
u(s
t 1
i )  u(2s
t 1
i ):
The main proposition of the paper is proposition 1. It states that given assump-
tion 1, an MPE exists in which starting from some initial allocations, a compromise
allocation is implemented from the rst period onward. This is true as long as dis-
count factors lie within an intermediate range. In the statement of the proposition,
and in the equilibrium characterization the set < indicates the union of all sets
[
 1
=0 and, similarly the set  indicates the union of all sets [

=0 .
Proposition 1. There exists a non-degenerate interval [;], and a set of allocations,
 i  < n
2 for every i 2 I, such that if u() satises assumption 1, then for every
16In the case of two legislators it is easy to see that there is no payo relevant state. Since there
are only two legislators, the proposer is automatically a majority, hence, eectively a dictator.
There is no inter-temporal decision so the unique solution to the single period maximization results
in the proposing legislator extracting the entire surplus. This is in contrast to the results of Dixit
et al. (2000).
12 2 [;] a symmetric MPE exists where if (s0;x1) 2 [i( i  fig) then (st 1;xt) 2
1  I for all t  1.
The proof is constructive. We characterize the equilibrium in the next section.
4.1 Equilibrium Characterization
Given an allocation st = (st
1;:::;st
n+1) and strategies (;) dene the dynamic payo
to player i as
Ui(s





The equilibrium acceptance strategy for any legislator i is 
i such that he accepts
proposals that give a dynamic payo that is at least as great as the payo to the







1 if Ui(p;;)  Ui(st 1;;)
0 otherwise:
Under the equilibrium proposal strategies, (;st 1;xt), if more than n
2 non-
proposing legislators have a zero status quo allocation, the proposing legislator will
extract the entire surplus and oer a no-compromise proposal. If less than n
2 non-
proposing legislators have a zero status quo allocation, and the status quo is not one
of the compromise allocations, (what we call interior allocations), the proposer will
either oer a compromise proposal or extract as much surplus as possible by using
a cherry-picking strategy. Once a compromise proposal has been implemented, the
compromise is sustained. We will consider proposal strategies for specic status quo
allocations.
4.1.1 Status Quo Allocations in the No-Compromise and Compromise
Classes
First consider all (st 1;xt), such that st 1 2 n. These are status quo allocations in
the no-compromise class. The equilibrium proposal strategy is to assign probability




1 for i = xt
0 for i 6= xt :
13Notice that this proposal is also an element of the set n this means that the no-
compromise class, n, represents a closed class of proposals. Now consider st 1 2
> n
2, or st 1 2 n
2 and s
t 1
xt 6= 0. These are allocations where more than n
2 non-
proposing legislators have a zero status quo allocation. The equilibrium proposal is
again the no-compromise proposal with probability 1, so 
i(p;st 1;xt 1) = 1.
Given these equilibrium strategies we can write down the dynamic payo to the





(1   )u(1) + Ext+1[Vi(;;p;xt+1)] if i = xt;
(1   )u(0) + Ext+1[Vi(;;p;xt+1)] if i 6= xt:
In the next period, since the status quo is an element of the no-compromise
class, the equilibrium strategy is the no-compromise proposal again so we can dene
the recursive payos when the status quo is in the no compromise class as V x for
the proposer and V z for everyone else. With probability 1
n+1 each legislator is the
proposer in the next period, hence any legislator's continuation value is V x with
probability 1
n+1 and V z with probability n
n+1. This gives
V x = (1   )u(1) + 
n+1 (V x + nV z);
V z = (1   )u(0) + 
n+1 (V x + nV z):
Normalizing u(0) = 0 and u(1) = 1, and solving gives
V x = n+1 n
n+1 (1)
and
V z = 
n+1: (2)
Now consider all (st 1;xt), such that st 1 2 1. These are status quo allocations
in the compromise class. Dene the compromise proposal generally as, pj, such that





0 if i = j;
1
n otherwise:
14If st 1 2 1 and s
t 1
xt = 1
n then one legislator (excluding the proposer) has a zero
status quo allocation and the remaining n legislators split the surplus evenly. The
equilibrium strategy assigns probability 1 to the compromise proposal pj, for j such
that s
t 1
j = 0. So the legislator that had a zero status quo allocation is given zero
again and all other legislators split the surplus evenly.
If st 1 2 1 and s
t 1
xt = 0, so the proposer's status quo allocation is zero, the
proposer takes a legislator at random to give no allocation and splits the surplus
evenly among himself and the remaining legislators. So 
i(pj;st 1;xt) = 1
n for all
j 2 I=fxtg. Notice again that once a proposal in the compromise class, 1, has been
implemented the equilibrium strategies dictate that all subsequent proposals lie in
this set. Hence the set of proposals 1 represents a closed class of proposals. The






(1   )u( 1
n) + Ext+1[Vi(;;pj;xt+1)] if i 6= j;
(1   )u(0) + Ext+1[Vi(;;pj;xt+1)] if i = j:
If the status quo is an element of the compromise class, the equilibrium strategy
is the compromise proposal again, so we can dene the recursive payo when the
status quo is in the compromise class as  for the legislators receiving 1
n and  for
the legislator that is frozen out. With probability n
n+1 each legislator receives the
same payo as he did in the previous period, and with probability 1
n+1 the current
loser becomes the proposer, and a new legislator is randomly selected to be frozen
out. These payos are given by









 = (1   )u(0) + 
n+1 ( + n):








Although equilibrium strategies are not fully specied, it is possible at this point
15to explain why a legislator does not deviate from the compromise and cherry-pick
n
2 legislators to form a minimum winning coalition. This is what denes the lower
bound on the discount factor as is explained in the next section.
Denition of . Consider a deviation from the compromise class in which the
proposing legislator employs a cherry-picking strategy. He will attempt to buy-o
a minimum winning coalition and extract the remainder of the surplus for himself.
The coalition in this case will consist of the legislator who was receiving zero under
the status quo and n
2   1 randomly selected legislators who were each receiving 1
n.
The legislator who is receiving zero, will accept zero because V z  .
The remaining n
2   1 legislators are receiving a dynamic payo of  under the
status quo, and the proposer is also receiving  under the status quo. Hence the
best the proposer will be able to do under a deviation is oer an equal amount to






deviation proposal is in the set  n
2 <n the continuation strategies dictate proceeding
to the no-compromise class and obtaining a continuation payo of 
n+1. Hence this






n+1. Conversely such a
deviation is prevented if and only if



















which is a contradiction, so the






holds by concavity of u(). Hence the proposer does not want to propose such a
deviation as long as legislators are patient enough. So there is a lower bound on the
discount factor, , such that for all  >  the inequality in (5) is satised. Lemma 5
in the appendix shows that  does not contradict the restriction on concavity.
4.1.2 Interior Status-Quo Allocations
Now consider st 1 2  n
2 with s
t 1
xt = 0. This is considered an interior allocation.
As Kalandrakis (2007) notes, it is not necessarily an equilibrium strategy to oer
a positive allocation to the legislator with the lowest positive status quo allocation,
while freezing out the others. This is because if a single legislator receives a positive
allocation in the next period with probability one, his continuation payo may be so
large that his dynamic payo exceeds the dynamic payo of other legislators with
16higher status quo allocations. The proposer in this case could do better by oering
the legislator with the higher status quo allocation an amount that would make him
indierent between his status quo and the low continuation payo. In equilibrium a
cherry-picking strategy is used where, with some probability, a share A(b) is oered
to one of b legislators. Following Kalandrakis (2007) and without loss of generality











xt = 0. Given a
value b 2 f1;:::; n
















minb 2 f1;:::; n
2g s.t. A(b)  A(b + 1);
n
2 + 1 otherwise:
Now dene the cherry-picking proposal, pj(A(b)), where legislator j receives A(b),








A(b) for i = j;
1   A(b) for i = xt;
0 otherwise:
The equilibrium proposal strategy is to assign probability j(b) to the cherry-









The intuition is that for any allocation in  n
2, it is a best response for a proposer
with a zero status quo allocation to randomize over legislators in such a way that
their dynamic payos are lower than the next highest status quo allocation legislator.
This ensures there is no incentive to deviate to oering any other legislator a positive
share.
Now consider the dynamic payo to the cherry-picking proposal pj(A(b)). This
proposal is an element of the set n 1 so the equilibrium continuation strategies
17Kalandrakis (2007) shows that b is unique.
17dictate that the no-compromise proposal, p, is implemented. The continuation pay-
os are therefore V x if legislator i is the proposer and V z otherwise. Hence we can









(1   )u(1   A(b)) + 
n+1 if i = xt;
(1   )u(A(b)) + 
n+1 if i = j;

n+1 otherwise.
The probability assigned to legislator i  b being allocated a positive share is i,













(1   )u(1   A(b)) + 
n+1 if i = xt
(1   )u(A(b))i + 




Given that legislators have concave stage utilities, it seems possible that there
would be an incentive for the proposer to deviate to the compromise proposal rather
than oering the cherry-picking strategy that leads to a very uncertain payo. Hence
legislators need to be impatient enough to avoid such a deviation. The next section
denes the rst upper bound on the discount factor that prevents such a deviation.
Denition of 1. The rst upper bound ensures that once a cherry-picking al-
location has been implemented, legislators no longer have an incentive to propose
the compromise. Consider a status quo in  n
2 when the proposer has a zero status
quo allocation. Equilibrium strategies dictate proposing a cherry-picking alloca-
tion such that one legislator receives A(b) and the proposer receives 1   A(b).
The dynamic payo for the proposer under the equilibrium strategy is therefore
(1   )u(1   A(b)) + 
n+1 since continuation strategies dictate remaining in the no-
compromise class. First, for the proposer to choose this allocation over the allocation
A(b) for himself and 1 A(b) to the coalition member, it must be that 1
2  1 A(b).
This holds by the restriction on concavity. 18 Now consider a deviation where the
proposer proposes a compromise allocation, pj. From equation (3) the payo from
such a deviation is . To show that this is not a protable deviation it suces to
show that
18See Appendix section 7.7.2.





























n+1, which is a contradiction. Hence this inequality represents
an upper bound on the discount factor, which we will call 1. Lemma 1 ensures that
there is a non-degenerate range between  and 1.
Lemma 1. There exists a non-degenerate interval [;1].













n+1. Since 4 < n there must be a non-degenerate range of  over which these two
conditions hold. 
Now consider st 1 2 < n
2n1. This is the remainder of the interior allocations.
Let Cj be the set of legislators that are a part of legislator j's coalition. Note that
that jCjj = n
2. Dene the vector of demands for legislator j's coalition member's





2 ), where 0  A
j
i  1. This is the set of allocations that
makes each of legislator j's coalition members at least indierent between the current
proposal and the status quo, given that legislator j is the proposer. Given a proposer
j and demands Aj the implemented proposal is either a cherry picking proposal,













i for i = xt
0 otherwise :
Notice that the cherry-picking proposals previously dened are a special case of
the cherry-picking proposal, p(Aj). Generally p(Aj) is in the set  n
2. If it is
an element of  n
2 the equilibrium continuation strategies will be the no-compromise
proposal, p, if the period t + 1 proposer has a positive status quo allocation. If the
period t + 1 proposer has a zero status quo allocation the continuation payos are
given by Vi( n
2;s
t 1
xt = 0), so the expected continuation payos for the cherry-picking





n+1(V x + n




xt = 0)) for pi(Aj) > 0;
1
n+1((n




xt = 0)) for pi(Aj) = 0:
(9)
19Below I remove the conditioning on (;) to conserve space. So the dynamic








i ) + Vi(Aj) if i 2 Cj;




i ) + Vi(Aj) if i = j
Vi(Aj) otherwise.
Denote the set of all permutations of cherry-picking proposals where legislator j is
the proposer, given a vector of demands, Aj, as P(Aj). The equilibrium strategy is
a probability distribution j() over all p(Aj) 2 P(Aj), and over all compromise
proposals pi 2 1. The intuition for the probability distribution over cherry-picking
proposals here is the same as before. If legislators with the lowest status quo allo-
cations are in the coalition with probability one, in some cases their dynamic payo
exceeds the dynamic payo to legislators who have higher status quo allocations,
hence the proposer would have an incentive to deviate to having these legislators in
the coalition. To avoid such a deviation, the equilibrium strategies are a probability
distribution over members of the coalition.




n+1), the vectors Aj and the
distributions j() are determined by the xed point of a map, B, that is discussed
in the following section.
4.2 Derivation of j() and Aj
Denote an arbitrary cherry-picking proposal by legislator j as p(Aj), and, as before,
let the set P(Aj) be all permutations of this cherry-picking proposal, given demands
Aj. Now denote for legislator j an arbitrary probability distribution over cherry-
picking proposals in P(Aj) and over all compromise proposals pi as j(), and let
 = (1();:::;n+1()). Finally, denote the matrix of demands for legislators j =
1;:::;n + 1 as A = (A1;:::;An+1).
Let Vi(A;) be the expected continuation payo for legislator i given demands,























20Hence given a status quo, an arbitrary vector of demands, and probability distribu-
tions, the dynamic payo to the status quo is
Ui(s
t 1;A;) = (1   )u(s
t 1
i ) + Vi(A;): (10)




















Dene a vector of these values as ^ Aj(st 1;A;). Last dene the set of all distributions
over cherry-picking proposals in P(Aj) and all compromise proposals as M(P(Aj)).
Now let us pick new demands and distributions, (Aj0;j0) 2 Bj(A;;st 1) where
Bj(A;;st 1) = f(Aj0;j0) :
(Aj0; ^ j0) 2 argmax ^ Aj;^ j Uj(st 1; ^ Aj;A j; ^ j; j)
s.t. ^ Aj = ^ Aj(st 1;A; ^ j; j)
^ j 2 M(P(Aj))







Lemma 2. The map B(A;;st 1) has a xed point (A;) such that (A;) 2
B(A;;st 1).
Proof. See Appendix. 
We can now formally dene the set  j to be the set of status quo allocations
where less than n
2 legislators have a zero allocation, and from which legislator j will




t 1 2 < n
2 : 
j(p
i) = 1 for some i
	
:
Now dene the set   to be the set of all status quo allocations for which there is




t 1 2 < n
2 : 
j(p
i) > 0 for some i; for some j
	
:
Note that  j   . Last dene all other allocations in < n
2 excluding the compromise






2 = < n
2=(  [ 1):
We can now provide an illustration of the equilibrium dynamics which will help
to give some intuition for the second upper bound on the discount factor. This is
given in gure 3 below.
1 Δ









Figure 3: Equilibrium Dynamics
Denition of 2. The second upper bound on the discount factor 2 prevents a
deviation from the compromise class into the set  j. For the three-legislator case
the set  1 is illustrated by the shaded area in Figure 2. The outer boundary of the
triangle implies a lower bound on the acceptor's status quo allocation.
Once the compromise class has been reached, at least one legislator must be
singled out every period to receive the zero allocation. If the proposer's status quo
is non-zero, he gives the zero to the legislator who already had zero, if not, he
must select someone at random to receive the zero. This means that within the
compromise, there is an element of uncertainty, and legislators may have incentives
22to \game" the system by proposing a share for themselves that will give a certain
continuation payo of . A proposer can do this by making a proposal that is within
 j for all j, while making sure he does not have the highest share. This guarantees
a continuation payo of .
The only way for there to be no such incentive, is if the allocations that are
attainable within  j are so small that they oset any gain in continuation payo. A
deviation st within  j for all j implies, at best, a continuation payo equal to , so
we must have that (1   )u(st
j) +   . So all allocations where legislator j does
not have the highest share, st




This boundary cannot be arbitrarily imposed since the boundaries of  j in the
next period are determined by the incentives of the next period's proposer (legislator
j). So this upper bound on the allocations attainable in  j must be induced by the
lower bound on the next period's acceptors' allocations. Figure 4 illustrates this point
for the case with three legislators. The horizontal dashed line in gure 4 represents
the upper bound on the deviation allocation for legislator 1 that is required to prevent
a deviation from the compromise class. The diagonal lines represent the lower bounds
on the acceptors' allocations implied by  1.
1
2 3
Figure 4: Decreasing 
The intersection of the diagonal lines, indicated by the black dot, represents
the maximum allocation the proposing legislator (legislator 1) can take while still
remaining in  1, based on the lower bound on the acceptors' allocations. This
maximum must lie below the dashed line in equilibrium. The arrows indicate the
direction in which these lines move as  decreases, so for  low enough, we achieve the




Figure 5: Condition for 2
The derivation of 2 is given in Section 7.3 in the Appendix, but below we discuss




















The right hand side of the expression is the payo to the coalition member when
legislator j is exactly indierent between compromise and cherry-picking. When the
proposer is indierent he receives an allocation equal to u 1() under the cherry-
picking strategy, so each of the n
2 coalition members receive an equal share of
2










i )+. The left hand side of the
inequality is the lower bound on the status quo payo to coalition members gener-
ated by imposing the upper bound on the proposer's status quo allocation of u 1().
It remains to be veried that  < 2 to guarantee a non-degenerate range between 
and 2. Lemma 3 shows that this is the case.19
Lemma 3. There exists a non-degenerate range [;2].
Proof. In the appendix. 
The upper bound on the discount factor, , is given by  = minf1;2g. By





equilibrium strategies, together with the incentive analysis in the Appendix section
7.7 and lemmas 2-3 complete the proof of proposition 1.
19Calculations of the bounds on the discount factor for specic parameterizations can be found
in the appendix in section 7.5.
244.3 Other Compromise Classes
The above characterization focused on the specic compromise class where a single
legislator received zero and the remaining legislators split the surplus evenly. How-
ever the equilibrium is not restricted to this compromise class. The signicance of
the compromise class is that it is a distinct set of allocations that signals the com-
promise, and there must be an incentive compatible algorithm to transition between
states in the compromise class, once the compromise class has been reached. Clearly,
not every compromise allocation can be sustained in this way. As mentioned before,
the perfect compromise is a notable example. The payos to the compromise class
must allow a non-degenerate set of allocations,  j, and must allow a non-degenerate
range of discount factors [;]. The perfect compromise fails the latter condition.
5 Comparative Statics
The intuition that more legislators make it easier for compromise to be sustained is
reected in the comparative statics for the range of discount factors for which this
equilibrium holds. We will show below that this range increases as the number of
legislators increases.
Proposition 2. For a large number of legislators, n, the range of discount factors
[;1] is increasing in n.
Proof. In the appendix. 
The proof proceeds by rst showing that the lower bound is decreasing for large
values of n. Then we show that the dierence between the lower bound and the
upper bound is increasing as a function of n for large values of n. The result is
similar for the range of [;2], but because of the complex implicit function we show
this for a parametrization of the utility function in appendix 7.5. The intuition for
this result is as follows. In this model legislators' incentives to compromise is driven
in part by the uncertainty over their future agenda-setting power. As the number of
legislators becomes large, this uncertainty increases, thereby increasing legislator's
willingness to compromise. This explains the decrease in the lower bound as n
becomes large. In addition, as the number of legislators increase, the dierence in
current period payo between a no-compromise proposal and a compromise proposal
25gets larger, making the no-compromise proposal more attractive, which drives up the
upper bound. Proposition 2 is illustrated in gure 6.
0 1 δ δ
Figure 6: Bounds on  as n increases
We would also like to consider what happens to the range on the admissible
discount factors as the utility function becomes more concave. Consider two utility
functions u() and v(), where v() is more concave than u() in the sense that v(s) 
u(s) for all s 2 [0;1], but v() still satises the normalization v(0) = 0 and v(1) = 1.
Proposition 3. As the utility function becomes more concave, the lower bound on
the discount factor decreases.
Proof. Denote the lower bound on the discount factor associated with utility function
u() as u and the lower bound on the discount factor associated with utility function








































































Proof. In the appendix. 
Since by lemma 4 h is a contraction, then we know that it has a unique xed
point, and, by denition, this xed point must be v. Also by h increasing in , we
26know that u  h(u)  h(h(u))  :::. Since we know that this process converges
to the xed point, v, by induction u  v.

The intuition for this result is that for more concave utility functions, the com-
promise becomes more attractive. So legislators do not need to be as patient to want
to sustain the compromise.
Proposition 4. As the utility function becomes more concave, the rst upper bound
on the discount factor, 1, decreases.
The proof here is identical to the proof of proposition 3 except that the mapping




















Again, the intuition is that, as the utility function becomes more concave, the com-
promise outcome becomes more attractive so legislators need to be even more impa-
tient to want to maintain no compromise. Section 7.6 in the appendix shows that the
results for the second upper bound are the same for some common parameterizations.
Propositions 3 and 4 are illustrated in gure 7.20
0 1 δ δ
Figure 7: Bounds on  as u() more concave
6 Conclusion
Casual observation indicates that almost all legislative districts in the United States
participate in benets from distributive policies. The theoretical literature on polit-
ical compromise shows no consensus on whether or not political compromise will be
achieved in equilibrium in a general setting [Dixit et al. (2000), Laguno (2001), and
Kalandrakis (2004)]. We provide a general framework that predicts conditions under
which political compromise is achieved, and when compromise is not achieved.
We model legislators with concave utilities that condition strategies only on infor-
mation that is payo relevant. We show existence of a set of equilibria that induces
20Note that by by lemmas 1 and 3 there always exists a non-degenerate range between  and .
27a Markov process with two closed classes of proposals: one in which no-compromise
is the outcome and the other in which more than a minimum winning majority share
in the surplus. We refer to the latter as the compromise outcome.
The question is what determines the outcome in equilibrium. We nd that the set
of initial allocations that lead to the compromise cannot be too unevenly distributed.
If they are unevenly distributed, in equilibrium, proposing legislators have an incen-
tive to propose the no-compromise outcome because they are not too patient, and
they can nd enough legislators to buy o cheaply. If initial allocations are well
distributed among non-proposing legislators the proposer will choose a compromise
outcome instead, because a minimum winning coalition is too expensive to buy o.
We show that this equilibrium holds for an intermediate range of discount factors.
This range becomes larger as the number of legislators increases, indicating that
compromise is easier to sustain with a larger number of legislators, contrary to
intuition. In addition, as the utility function becomes more concave, both end-points
of the range decrease.
Interestingly, we nd that the perfect compromise cannot be sustained with the
equilibrium strategies we construct (although other compromise classes can be). The
reason is that there needs to be some modest punishment for deviating from the
compromise class back to allocations that lead directly to compromise. The absence
of such a penalty leads to an infeasible range of discount factors that sustains the
equilibrium. The question still remains whether the perfect compromise can be
sustained as a Markov Perfect equilibrium of this game, but we leave this for future
work.
7 Appendix
7.1 Proof of Lemma 2
To prove the map B has a xed point I will employ Kakutani's Fixed Point Theorem. The space of A
and  are [0;1]
n(n+1)
2 and [0;1](n+1) respectively. These spaces are non-empty, compact and convex.
The correspondence B is non-empty since Uj(st 1; ^ Aj;A j; ^ j; j) is continuous and the space
of ^ Aj and ^ j are compact so a maximizer exists. The map B must also be convex valued since
Uj(st 1; ^ Aj;A j; ^ j; j) is linear in j0, and any Aj0 that maximizes Uj(st 1; ^ Aj;A j; ^ j; j)




i . By Theorem of the Maximum we can show that B is upper
hemicontinuous.
For Theorem of the Maximum we already know that Uj(st 1; ^ Aj;A j; ^ j; j) is continuous,
28we need only show M(P(Aj)) compact, and M(P(Aj)) continuous. To show M(P(Aj)) continuous
and compact note that there are a nite number of elements of P(Aj), specically, jP(Aj)j =n P n
2 .
So M(P(Aj)) is essentially the m-dimensional simplex, where m =n P n
2 . This space is compact
and continuous.
7.2 Lemma 5
The following lemma shows that there is no contradiction between the lower bound on the discount
factor and the restriction on concavity.










Proof. The restriction on concavity and the lower bound on the discount factor implies
n + 1   




















To show that there is no contradiction we must show that it is possible for
n + 1   





















2n2 + n   3n2   1 + 2 + 2n2   2
(n +    n)(n + 1   n)




, which clearly holds. 
7.3 Derivation of 
We would like to ensure that once in the compromise class, the proposer does not have an incentive
to deviate to an allocation outside the compromise class, but that would lead to the compromise
with certainty. We are interested in the maximum that the proposer, legislator j, can allocate to




j cannot be the largest allocation (otherwise the continuation payo is ), it must be smaller
than 1
2 minus the allocations of all other legislators. Because of concavity, for an optimal deviation










2   (n   1)st
i









29For st to be in  j the payo to the proposer under st must not exceed the payo to a cherry-
picking proposal. Letting A
j
i denote the demands of the coalition members given an allocation st























The maximum deviation for the proposer will put all the acceptors at the lower bound hence for










We are interested in the deviation allocations, st
i, that results in these A
j
i's for the coalition
members. Assuming all continuation strategies lead to the compromise class, the payo to st for a
coalition member is given by
Ui(st) = (1   )u(st
i) + : (14)
To calculate their demands under a cherry-picking proposal, this must be set equal to Ui(p(A)).
Given that all coalition members are symmetric, they face equal probability of being in the coalition
of a proposer with a zero status quo allocation in the next period. Hence Ui(p(A)) is given by
Ui(p(A)) =
(1   )(n + 1)

















































Finally, substituting the value of u(st
i) from (16) into inequality 12 gives the upper bound on






























+   (1   )
n + 1


















n+1 which by concavity of u() is a contradiction, but










hence it is satised. Given that the
30expressions on the left hand side and right hand side are both continuous in , this implies that
there exists some  for which this expression holds with equality and below which the equality is
always satised. This gives the second upper bound on the discount factor 2.
7.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Now to show that  < 2 we have the following proof.
























n+1  . To show
that there exists a non-degenerate range we must prove that at  the condition for 2 is strictly
satised. Substituting 







































































































































































































































































Combining this last line with inequality 20 shows that inequality 17 holds. Hence the result is
proved.

7.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. The dierence in the range of the discount factor is simply 1   , so we are interested in
the sign of @
@n(1   ) = @1
@n  
@
@n. We will rst show that
@
@n is negative, and then show that @1
@n
is either negative, but smaller in magnitude, or positive. Dene the function

















We will show that for large values of n this is negative by rst showing that the denominator
is negative and then showing that the numerator is also negative for large values of n.
Lemma 6. The partial derivative of f(;n) with respect to  is negative.






































































. Combining with (26) gives the
desired result. 
Lemma 7. The partial derivative of f(;n) with respect to n is negative for large values of n.
Proof. The partial derivative of f(;n) with respect to n is
@nf(;n) =  










[2n(1   ) + 1]





(n + 1   n)
n(n + 1)(n +    n)
:












Taking limits of this as n ! 1 we know that u0   2
n

 u0   1
n

so this term is negative. 
Lemma 8. For a large number of legislators, n, the lower bound on the discount factor, , is
decreasing in n.
This follows from lemmas 6 and 7 we have that the result. Now dene the function

































This is larger in absolute value than @f(;n). The partial derivative of f(;n) with respect to n is
@nf(;n) =  






[2n(1   ) + 1]




(n + 1   n)
n(n + 1)(n +    n)
:
Notice that this must be larger than @nf(;n). With a larger denominator and either positive or






@n must be positive. 
Since the second upper bound on the discount factor is given by a complex implicit function
it is not possible to say much about it without parameterizing the utility function. What follows
will show for a common parameterization that the range between the lower bound and the second
upper bound is increasing as n increases.
Consider the parameterization u(s) = s
1
b with b > 1. The lower bound on the discount factor











n+1 and the right hand side of this expression as RHSl = . The upper bound





















+  and the right








n+1. We plot these four expressions as a
function of  in gure 9.
δ 2 δ
Figure 8: Bounds on , n = 6, b = 2
The blue lines indicate the conditions for the lower bound on the discount factor, with the
dashed line being the left hand side of this expression. So for all values where the dashed blue line
is below the solid blue line the condition for the lower bound on the discount factor is satised.
The red lines indicate the conditions for the upper bound on the discount factor, with the dashed
34red line being the left hand side of the expression. Clearly where the dashed red line is below the
solid red line, the conditions for the upper bound on the discount factor is met so the admissible
range of the discount factor is indicated between  and 2. Notice these values are approximately
  0:40 and 2  0:46. Now consider when n = 10 as illustrated below.
δ 2 δ
Figure 9: Bounds on , n = 10, b = 2
Notice that the lower bound has decreased signicantly, it is now approximately   0:38, but
the upper bound has moved very little and is still approximately 2  0:46. These results are
consistent for variations of the utility function and variations in n.
7.6 2 Decreasing with Concavity
For the parameterization u(s) = s
1
b with b > 1 the function becomes more concave as b increases.
Let us consider when the number of legislators is at it's lower bound, so n = 6. By lemma 7.7.2 we
know that the range is greater at any higher value of n. Figure 9 illustrated when u() is not too
concave, so b = 2. Now let us consider when b = 10, so the utility function becomes more concave.
The expressions are plotted in gure 10 below. Notice that now   0:081 and 2  0:120. Hence
the entire range has shifted down and the absolute value of the range has decreased.










For this specication increases in the parameter  represent increases in the concavity of the utility
function. The eects of increases in  display the same result. At n = 6 and  = 2,   0:46 and
2  0:79. At n = 6 and  = 10,   0:16 and 2  0:23. So again the range has shifted down and
has narrowed in absolute value.
35δ 2 δ
Figure 10: Bounds on , n = 6, b = 10
7.7 Complete Incentives
A complete incentives analysis ensures that for each set indicated in gure 3 there is no incentive
to transition to any other set than what the equilibrium strategies dictate. So we proceed by
considering status quo allocations in each set.
7.7.1 st 1 2 n
2 <n
Consider a status-quo st 1 2  n
2 <n. The equilibrium strategies dictate a no-compromise proposal
p such that the proposer, xt, receives payo V x from equation (1), and all other legislators receive
payos V z from equation (2). These are
V x = n+1 n
n+1
and
V z = 
n+1:
Consider the incentives of legislators to accept the equilibrium proposal. Under the status quo
at least n
2 non-proposing legislators are receiving payo V z hence there at least n
2 legislators who
will accept a payo of V z, hence achieving a majority of votes.
Now consider incentives of the proposer to propose this allocation rather than any other devi-
ation allocation. Consider deviation allocations in the following sets.
Deviation into 1
Consider a deviation such that the proposer proposes a compromise allocation pi for some i.
In the compromise class the best available dynamic payo is  given by (3). We check that   V x.
We have
36n(n + 1   n)






















. To show that this is not protable deviation it suces to show that   1 where























Since the RHS of this inequality is negative and the LHS is positive, the condition is violated
meaning that  < 1. So  implies that   V x. It is useful to note that at 1, the value  = 1.
This will be useful below.
Deviation into  n
2 <<n
Consider a deviation to an arbitrary allocation in  n
2 <<n, once in this set equilibrium dynamics
dictate proceeding to the no compromise set n. Hence the continuation values of the deviation
into  n
2 <<n and playing the equilibrium outlined for n are identical. It thus suces to compare
the stage allocations from the deviation to the equilibrium allocation where the proposer, legislator
j, receives 1  
P
i6=j st
i. Clearly 1  
P
i6=j st
i < 1 so this is not a protable deviation.
Deviation into = n
2
Consider a deviation to an allocation in = n
2 , once in this set equilibrium dynamics dictate
proceeding to the no-compromise set, n, or if the proposer, xt+1, possesses a zero status quo
allocation then proceed to  n









A + Vj(st): (27)
Substituting for the dierent values of Vj( n
2 ;st
xt = 0) in equation (8) we obtain the following. If
Vj( n
2 ;st
xt = 0) = 
n+1, we have that Vj(st) = 1
n+1. As shown above, the continuation value is the
same for the proposer but the stage payo is lower hence this is not a protable deviation. Now
consider if Vi( n
2 ;st
xt = 0) = (1 )u(A(b))+ 
n+1, so that he ensures he is in the coalition in the
next period. The subsequent proposal strategies are such that the probability assigned to him being
in the coalition ensures that his dynamic payo is exactly equal to (1 )u(A(b))+ 
n+1, hence this
cannot be a protable deviation. Last, for the case Vj( n
2 ;s
t 1
xt = 0) = (1 )u(1   A(b))+ 
n+1.
For this to be the continuation from the deviation, it must be that the proposer allocates a zero
share to himself. Substituting this into (27), we show that the deviation payo is equal to
37
n + 1




This is clearly less than V x since 




Consider a deviation to an allocation in c
< n
2 . The payo from this deviation is given by
equation (10). This is
Uj(st;A;) = (1   )u(st
j) + Vj(A;):
Let us consider the continuation payo Vj(A;). Notice that if legislator j is included in any
coalition in the next period, equilibrium proposal strategies, i, are such that his payo from the
allocation st are equal to or less than his payo from the next period's cherry-picking allocation,
hence
Uj(st;A;)  (1   )u(Ai) + Vj(Ai):
This payo we just showed is always lower than V x, hence this is not a protable deviation.
Now consider if he is not included in a coalition in the next period. As shown below in section
7.7.3 this continuation payo is strictly less than 1
n+1, and since 1  
P
i6=j st
i < 1 this deviation is
also not protable.
Deviation into  
A deviation into the set   may imply a deviation into any arbitrary intersection of  i. Note
that if it is any intersection that includes  j, by  the status quo payo to being in  j is never
greater than , and we know again by  that  < V x hence this is not a protable deviation. Now
consider a deviation into some arbitrary intersection that does not include  j. If the deviation is
such that legislator j is included in any other legislator's coalition, by the same arguments above
the payo from the deviation is Uj(st;A;) = (1 )u(Ai
j )+V (Ai), which we showed is always
lower than V x.
So we must consider when the deviation allocation is not in  j, and the legislator is not
included in anyone else's coalition. By the upper bound on the discount factor the minimum stage
payo to coalition members, st







i). Hence the stage
payo to any other player, when an allocation is in  i must be less than . In continuation, the
proposing legislator gets at most V x if he is the proposer, 
n+1 if he is not the proposer and the
legislator does not choose compromise, and  if he is not the proposer and the legislator chooses
compromise. Letting  denote the fraction of legislators that would choose compromise, the payo
for the proposing legislator under such a deviation. st is
















Noting that this is a convex combination of values that are no greater than V x, this payo is not
greater than V x.
387.7.2 st 1 2 n
2
When the status quo is in  n
2 equilibrium strategies specify either a no compromise proposal if
the proposer has a positive status-quo allocation, or a cherry-picking proposal, pj(A(b)), if the
proposer has a status quo allocation of zero. For s
t 1
xt > 0, where the the equilibrium proposal
made is in n, the incentives analysis is identical to status quo allocations in  n
2 <n. Below we
will show that for s
t 1
xt = 0, there are no protable deviations.
Let us rst check the incentives of the accepting legislators. The payo to the legislator receiving
zero allocation is 




[ + (1   )u(1   A(b))]:
Simplifying shows that 
n+1 > Vi(Aj) since 1 > u(1   A(b)). The legislator that is oered a
positive status quo allocation is oered A(b) with probability i, where A(b) and i are calculated
to make the accepting legislator exactly indierent to the status quo.
Now we consider possible deviation proposals by the proposer. Under the equilibrium strategies
the proposer receives the payo (1   )u(1   A(b)) + 
n+1.
Deviation into  n
2 n
For deviations in  n
2 n, we rely on the proof in Kalandrakis (2007) but restate his concavity
restrictions and show that it is satised by the concavity restriction in assumption 1. First to ensure
that the amount allocated to the coalition member, A(b), is not greater than 1 A(b), the utility
function cannot be too concave, so
(n + 1)(n + 2)




























(n + 1)(n + 2)







n + 1   



















(n + 1)(n + 2)












Second, to ensure that a proposer will not prefer another allocation in  n
2 to the equilibrium
proposal it must also be the case that
39n + 1









Again by assumption 1 we have
n + 1
n + 1   
u(st
i) 
n + 1   










Hence these inequalities are satised.
Deviation into 1




This deviation involves allocating more than n
2 players a positive share under the deviation
proposal. Equilibrium strategies after the deviation dictates an allocation in  n
2 , for which the
continuation payos are no greater than in n as shown in section 7.7.3. The proposer will have to
allocate a positive share to at least one player that possesses a positive share under the status quo,
making him at least indierent to the status quo, as in the equilibrium strategy, and, in addition,
allocate some "j > 0 to another n
2   1 players also making them at least indierent to the status
quo. This implies a lower stage payo to proposer than under the equilibrium strategy, while not
improving the proposer's continuation payo. Hence this is not a protable deviation.
7.7.3 st 1 2 c
< n
2
Consider incentives when the status quo is an element of c
< n
2 and legislator j is the proposer.
From these allocations legislator j makes a cherry-picking proposal such that coalition members
i 2 Cj are oered the demands A
j
i , where Aj and j solve
(Aj; ^ j) 2 argmax ^ Aj;^ j Uj(st 1; ^ Aj;A j; ^ j; j)
s.t. ^ Aj = ^ Aj(st 1;A; ^ j; j)
^ j 2 M(P(Aj))















Let us rst check the coalition member's incentives. We must verify that coalition members will
prefer this allocation to the status quo. Note that if A
j
i < 1, then Ui(st 1;A;)  Ui(p(Aj)).




i < 1  
40u 1() < 1 hence each coalition member's demand must also be less than 1 hence their incentives
hold.
Now let us check the proposer's incentives. Given that this solves the maximization problem
for the proposer we know the proposer would prefer this to any other cherry-picking allocation that
would be accepted, or any compromise allocation. We must also verify that the proposer would
prefer this to remaining at the status quo allocation. Under the status quo the proposer has the
payo
Uj(st 1;A;) = (1   )u(s
t 1
j ) + Vj(A;):
Under the cherry-picking proposal, he has payo










We will prove that Uj(st 1;A;)  Uj(p(Aj)) by rst showing that Vj(A;)  Vj(Aj)
and then showing that u(s
t 1








. We will rst consider the lower bound on












































When legislator j is not the proposer he is in another legislator's coalition if Uj(st 1;A;) is
suciently low. So at a maximum value of Uj(st 1;A;) legislator j is not included in the other




















We showed above that Vj(Aj) = 1
n+1. When any other legislator i 6= j proposes in period t,


















xt+1 = 0) = (1 )u(1 A(b))+ 
n+1 when legislator j is the proposer in period t+1
and is 




































































Notice that the value in square brackets is the convex combination of two values that are less than
1, hence the value in brackets is less than 1 making Vj(A;)  1
n+1 = Vj(Aj).
Now we must prove u(s
t 1














i . First observe that
if s
t 1
i are equal for all i 2 Cj, this implies the minimum value of
P
i2Cj Aj for any given s
t 1
j .
Now observe that s
t 1
j  1   ns
t 1
i since all other legislators must have at least as high a status
quo allocation as the coalition members if we assume the legislators with the lowest status quo




i in terms of s
t 1
i we must calculate
the value of A
j
i as a function of s
t 1














Here Ui(st 1;A;) = (1   )u(s
t 1
i ) + Vi(A;). We wish to nd the maximum value of
Ui(st 1;A;), let's call this value Ui. This is where legislator i is included in n other legislator's
coalition in period t, and recall that if he is included in the coalition then he receives at least Ui.
So









The maximum value Ui(p(Ai)) can take is V x. Substituting in 33 and simplifying gives
Ui =
(1   )(n + 1)











i > 0. So we
conjecture that A
j
i > 0 and nd the minimum value of Ui(p(Aj)). Let's call this minimum value
Ui. Given that we are considering coalition members with equal status quos and hence equal values
of A
j
i , they will face equal probability, 1
n+1, of being in the coalition of the period t + 1 legislator
if his status quo allocation was zero. So





[V x + (n   1)V z + Ui]:
Substituting and simplifying gives
42Ui =
(1   )(n + 1)











n + 1   






i > 0 by assumption, hence the conjecture that A
j
i > 0 is proved true. We wish to
have 1   ns
t 1
i  1   n
2A
j
i . Substituting from (34) for A
j
i and simplifying gives
n + 1   
n + 1   n
u(s
t 1
i )  u(2s
t 1
i ):
This is satised by the restriction on concavity in assumption 1.
7.7.4 st 1 2  
Let us rst consider st 1 in
Tn+1
j=1  j, and the incentives of the proposing legislator. Since j(pi) =
1 is the solution to the xed point of the map B we know that pi is optimal for the proposer among
cherry-picking strategies and among compromise proposals. We also know by the upper bound on
the discount factor, , that the proposer will prefer the compromise to remaining at the the status
quo allocation.
Now let us consider the incentives of the accepting legislators. Since the status quo is an element
of
Tn+1
j=1  j and all legislators are symmetric, we know by the upper bound on the discount factor,
, that the highest status quo payo available to any legislator satises (1   )u(st 1) +   .
Hence no legislator has an incentive to deviate from accepting the compromise allocation.
Now consider st 1 2   where 0 < j(pi) < 1 for some proposing legislator j and some i.
Consider the proposing legislator's incentives. Again, we know since j(pi) is the solution to the
xed point of the map B the proposer is indierent between the compromise proposal pi and some
cherry-picking strategy, so the payo to legislator j when he is the proposer is  regardless, and
this is optimal among cherry-picking proposals and compromise proposals. We must check that
it is preferred to the status quo. If legislator j is not the proposer, other legislators will choose
either a cherry-picking strategy or a compromise proposal. Under another legislator's cherry-picking
strategy, his payo is highest when he is included in the coalition, and then he is given at most his
status quo payo. Let us call this status quo payo, Uj, and let's say with probability  he receives
this payo, and with probability 1    he receives  under a compromise. His status quo payo
can therefore be written down as
Uj = (1   )u(s
t 1










To show that the proposer has no incentive to deviate from the compromise proposal to the status-
quo, we must show that   Uj. This is true, by the upper bound on the discount factor. Since we
43know that they highest status quo payo to any proposer j when the status quo is in  j satises
u(s
t 1
i )  .
Now we must check the incentives of legislators to accept the proposal. Consider a status quo






. With the proposer receiving " and all other legislators
receiving 1 "
n . This would represent the most restrictive allocation in  j for the proposer. That is,
any other allocation in  j must result in a lower payo for potential coalition members. If at such
an allocation acceptors will accept the compromise, then they will accept at any other allocation.
Let us denote the payo to this status quo allocation as Ui. This is given by






We wish to place an upper bound on the continuation payo Vi(A;). If an accepting
legislator i becomes the proposer, he can obtain a dynamic payo of no more than V x or n+1 n
n+1 .
If legislator i is not the proposer, and legislator j is the proposer, he can obtain no more than
. If any of the n   1 other legislators is the proposer, since all legislators have equal status quos
except legislator j, they have equal probability of being in the coalition hence, they receive payo
Ui again. Otherwise they receive at most 
n+1. Hence the payo Ui can be written as



















2(n + 1)(1   )


































n+1 and by the restriction









. So we have









n + 1   










It remains to show that n+1 
n+1 n  2
2 . Simplifying, we show that this is true since n > 2.
Clearly the payo for the proposer if the status quo is in  = j satises the above condition
by symmetry, that is Uj  . And if the status quo is in  = j, since (Aj;j) is the solution to













+ Vj(Aj) hence he will have no incentive to deviate to from the
44equilibrium strategy.
7.7.5 st 1 2 1
Consider a status-quo st 1 2 1. The equilibrium strategies dictate a compromise proposal pi such
that all legislators except legislator i receives payo  and legislator i receives payo . Consider
the incentives of legislators to accept. Under the status quo at least n 1 non-proposing legislators
are receiving payo  hence there at least n   1 legislators who will accept a payo of , thereby
achieving a majority of votes.
Now consider incentives of the proposer to propose this allocation rather than any other devi-
ation allocation. Consider deviation allocations in the following sets.
Deviation into n
As shown above the payo from proposing p compared to p would represent a protable
deviation for the proposer 1. So we need to check the incentives for coalition members to accept
such a proposal. The payo for coalition members from the deviation would be V z whereas the
payo from the status quo is . Clearly
V z  





(n + 1   n)
Hence the proposer will not be able to form a coalition that accepts such a proposal, and the
deviation is not possible.
Deviation into  
In section 7.7.4 we showed that the dynamic payo to any status quo in   is no greater than
 hence deviating to   is never protable from 1.
Deviation into  n
2 <<n
We have already shown in section 4.1.1 that by  this is not a protable deviation.




In section 4.1.1,  implied by condition 5 ensures that a deviation from the compromise class
to an allocation with cherry picking in  n
2 <<n is not possible. Attempting to deviate into  n
2 ,
requires compensating an extra player over and above the n
2   1 in deviating into  n
2 <<n. If
compensating n
2  1 players is not protable for any proposer, then it follows that compensating n
2
players will be even less protable, hence this deviation is also ruled out.
7.8 Proof of Lemma 4







n+1](n+1) we have the following proof.
45Proof. The distance between x and y is simply the Euclidean distance jx   yj. Hence

















































n + 1   xn
n + x   xn
 
n + 1   yn
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